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I thank Bob Doris for making that point. That was not the implication of my remarks, but it is very helpful that he set that out, and I take that point in the spirit in which it was made.

There are a number of areas in which provisions are contingent on other things happening. I would be very cautious about proceeding on that basis. I am sure that we will have debates about that in future groups, but I have set out my concerns in relation to that point.

This is probably more a question for the representatives of the fishing sector, but I will not be here for the session with that panel, so I will chuck it in now.

With regard to the discussions that Phil Taylor and Calum Duncan mentioned, to what extent is there an understanding of the likely impact of displacement of effort on other areas? If there is a displacement, there will be increased effort in those areas, albeit that they might be better able to sustain such activity. Phil or Calum, would you like to address that?

I am grateful for that answer.

I do not think so. My proposals would put in place a heavily safeguarded and transparent process whereby the individual who makes the request would be supported to understand the available options and in which medics would identify where there are needs and where those needs are not being met. All of that would happen in a way that is simply not the case at the moment, when those individuals are being left entirely to their own devices, often alone, and are making horrendous choices and decisions for themselves that not only further traumatise them but, as we know, traumatise those whom they ultimately leave behind. There are certainly gaps in palliative care, mental health and broader health and care services.

As I said, the proposals will put in place a robustly safeguarded process that means that anybody who comes forward to make the request has the reassurance of knowing that the wider context for the choice that they are seeking to exercise has been tested to the nth degree. That can therefore bring a degree of further reassurance and safeguarding to things that are happening at the moment. Decisions on matters such as double effect, palliative sedation and all the rest of it are being taken by medics, sometimes placing them in an invidious position, often without the input of the patient and sometimes without even the input of family members. There is an opportunity here to provide not just a robust safeguard but a degree of transparency that will be to the benefit of patients, but also to the benefit of medical practitioners.

I invite Dr Ward to add to that.

As you have described, it would be my expectation that the clause would apply to the people who are directly involved in the process, which I think is a proportionate approach to conscientious objection. A degree of caution needs to be exercised when drawing parallels between the process that is described here and abortion legislation. I think that the way in which the conscientious objection clause works is appropriate in the context of assisted dying.

Other people might be, at some stage, removed from the process. One of the examples that was given to me was of people in a hospital or a hospice setting who are aware that colleagues are, through the proposals in my bill, engaged in assisting somebody at the end of life, and might have an objection to that.

Extending that conscientious objection too extensively is problematic. It is about choice for those who are actively participating in the process. Extending it more widely runs the risk of putting up unnecessary and unjustified barriers to individual patients who meet all the eligibility criteria by denying them access to that choice.

As I say, “ordinarily resident” is a legal concept that is understood. I noted the concerns that Police Scotland raised. I would be interested to know whether Police Scotland feels that there is an alternative definition that would address its concerns. The concept is fairly well established, and I do not know whether there is a way of defining it in the bill any differently from what is set out in the explanatory notes and policy memorandum, which I think make the policy intent clear.

That is another area where I would be happy to reflect on any proposed changes. However, the fact that the “ordinarily resident” requirement sits alongside a requirement for people to be registered with a GP probably gets around the concerns.

I understand where Police Scotland is coming from because it engages more often with the criminal law, and perhaps that is where some confusion arises, but I am fairly comfortable that that concern has not been raised by others and that the concept is pretty well established and understood.

In looking at other jurisdictions, it is interesting to see the landscape that grows up around such legislation. Many charities and third sector organisations that have been campaigning for a change in the law have made it clear that they expect to continue to provide help, support and advice to people who might seek to access assisted dying. Those organisations might also be able to provide the sort of support that you are talking about. The need for that might be rare, but it would be good to think that, where such a need existed, it would be met.

The consistent feedback from jurisdictions in which assisted dying laws have been introduced is that the process of coming to terms with a loved one’s death and going through the grieving process thereafter is eased by knowing that that loved one had the choice, the control, the dignity and so on at the end of life that, at the moment, are absent here in Scotland, for a small but not insignificant number of people.

I need to keep reinforcing the point that we are talking about assisted dying because that is the focus of the bill. However, the vast majority of Scots will continue not to need an assisted death. They will be supported by palliative care, social care and other health and care services up to the point of death.

I have probably not said enough about conscientious objection. This is fundamentally about choice; it is about giving dying Scots the choice, should they wish it. However, that works both ways, and there absolutely needs to be a robust conscientious objection mechanism in place to allow medical professionals who would otherwise be involved to opt out of that involvement, subject to the expectation that they would then refer the patient to someone who could provide that support. That conscientious objection choice for the medic is fundamental.

My problem with an institutional objection is that the organisation in question might well involve and include individuals who are supportive of a change in the law. It then ceases to be about individual choice, because the risk is that barriers can be put in place to individuals who, despite meeting all the eligibility criteria and being protected by the safeguards that are in place, find that, as a result of an institutional opt-out, they are not able to access the choice. We have seen that happen in other jurisdictions, and it has proved problematic.

I think, though, that there are ways of managing that. I know from speaking to those involved in the hospice sector in New Zealand, for example, that there is a mixed picture with regard to the engagement of individual hospices. Although some might not directly be involved in the provision of assisted dying, they will allow practitioners into the hospice to help deliver the service. There might well be a way of having a more flexible approach that recognises the strong emotions and feelings that some people have around this issue, but which ensures that those emotions and feelings do not stand in the way of individuals who meet the eligibility criteria accessing the choice that I feel they need to have.

That takes us back to the issues that Mr Whittle raised earlier. Any discussion of the options exposes them and allows an opportunity to address them. The committee heard from witnesses in Australia that the quality and level of engagement with palliative care has gone up since the introduction of assisted dying, not only because additional investment has gone into that care but because conversations have raised awareness of palliative care and have led to discussion of and active engagement with what those options are and how they might be applied.

As I said in response to your initial question, there is probably no way to prevent an individual from bringing a legal challenge, but the mechanisms in the bill provide a high level of protection against such cases arising. Challenges tend to come from family members who have a difficulty with the decision that their relative has made. Conscientious objection exists in the medical profession and we can put that into the bill, but we cannot put into the bill protections for family members who are implacably opposed to the option and who therefore might have difficulty with a relative opting to go down that route.